Partial Payments

In the default case, the Amount field of a Payment transaction in the XAG Ledger specifies the exact amount to deliver, after charging for exchange rates and transfer fees. The "Partial Payment" flag (tfPartialPayment) allows a payment to succeed by reducing the amount received instead of increasing the amount sent. Partial payments are useful for returning payments without incurring additional costs to oneself.

The amount of XAG used for the transaction cost is always deducted from the sender’s account, regardless of the type of transaction.

Partial payments can be used to exploit naive integrations with the XAG Ledger to steal money from exchanges and gateways. The Partial Payments Exploit section of this document describes how this exploit works and how you can avoid it.


Without Partial Payments

When sending a Payment that does not use the Partial Payment flag, the Amount field of the transaction specifies the exact amount to deliver, and the SendMax field specifies the maximum amount and currency to send. If a payment cannot deliver the full Amount without exceeding the SendMax parameter, or the full amount cannot be delivered for any other reason, the transaction fails. If the SendMax field is omitted from the transaction instructions, it is considered to be equal to the Amount. In this case, the payment can only succeed if the total amount of fees is 0.

In other words:

Amount + (fees) = (sent amount) ≤ SendMax

In this formula, "fees" refers to transfer fees and currency exchange rates. The "sent amount" and the delivered amount (Amount) may be denominated in different currencies and converted by consuming Offers in the XAG Ledger's decentralized exchange.

Note: The Fee field of the transaction refers to the XAG transaction cost, which is destroyed to relay the transaction to the network. The exact transaction cost specified is always debited from the sender and is completely separate from the fee calculations for any type of payment.

With Partial Payments

When sending a Payment that has the Partial Payment flag enabled, the Amount field of the transaction specifies a maximum amount to deliver. Partial payments can succeed at sending some of the intended value despite limitations including fees, not enough liquidity, not enough space in the receiving account's trust lines, or other reasons.

The optional DeliverMin field specifies a minimum amount to deliver. The SendMax field functions the same as with non-partial payments. The partial payment transaction is successful if it delivers any amount equal or greater than the DeliverMin field without exceeding the SendMax amount. If the DeliverMin field is not specified, a partial payment can succeed by delivering any positive amount.

In other words:

Amount ≥ (Delivered Amount) = SendMax - (Fees) ≥ DeliverMin > 0

Partial Payment Limitations

Partial Payments have the following limitations:

  • A partial payment cannot provide the XAG to fund an address; this case returns the result code telNO_DST_PARTIAL.
  • Direct XAG-to-XAG payments cannot be partial payments; this case returns the result code temBAD_SEND_XAG_PARTIAL.
    • However, issuance-to-XAG payments or XAG-to-issuance payments can be partial payments.

The delivered_amount Field

To help understand how much a partial payment actually delivered, the metadata of a successful Payment transaction includes a delivered_amount field. This field describes the amount actually delivered, in the same format as the Amount field.

For non-partial payments, the delivered_amount field of the transaction metadata is equal to the Amount field of the transaction. When a payment delivers an issued currency, the delivered_amount may be slightly different than the Amount field due to rounding.

The delivered amount is not available for transactions that meet both of the following criteria:

  • Is a partial payment
  • Is included in a validated ledger before 2014-01-20

If both conditions are true, then delivered_amount contains the string value unavailable instead of an actual amount. If this happens, you can only determine the actual delivered amount by reading the AffectedNodes in the transaction's metadata. If the transaction delivered an issued currency and the issuer of the Amount is the same account as the Destination address, the delivered amount may be divided among multiple AffectedNodes members representing trust lines to different counterparties.

You can find the delivered_amount field in the following places:

API Method Field
JSON-RPC / WebSocket account_tx method result.transactions array members' meta.delivered_amount
JSON-RPC / WebSocket tx method result.meta.delivered_amount
JSON-RPC / WebSocket transaction_entry method result.metadata.delivered_amount
JSON-RPC / WebSocket ledger method (with transactions expanded) result.ledger.transactions array members' metaData.delivered_amount New in: rippled 1.2.1
WebSocket Transaction subscriptions Subscription messages' meta.delivered_amount New in: rippled 1.2.1
RippleAPI getTransaction method outcome.deliveredAmount
RippleAPI getTransactions method array members' outcome.deliveredAmount

Partial Payments Exploit

If a financial institution's integration with the XAG Ledger assumes that the Amount field of a Payment is always the full amount delivered, malicious actors may be able to exploit that assumption to steal money from the institution. This exploit can be used against gateways, exchanges, or merchants as long as those institutions' software does not process partial payments correctly.

The correct way to process incoming Payment transactions is to use the delivered_amount metadata field, not the Amount field. This way, an institution is never mistaken about how much it actually received.

Exploit Scenario Steps

To exploit a vulnerable financial institution, a malicious actor does something like this:

  1. The malicious actor sends a Payment transaction to the institution. This transaction has a large Amount field and has the tfPartialPayment flag enabled.
  2. The partial payment succeeds (result code tesSUCCESS) but actually delivers a very small amount of the currency specified.
  3. The vulnerable institution reads the transaction's Amount field without looking at the Flags field or delivered_amount metadata field.
  4. The vulnerable institution credits the malicious actor in an external system, such as the institution's own ledger, for the full Amount, despite only receiving a much smaller delivered_amount in the XAG Ledger.
  5. The malicious actor withdraws as much of the balance as possible to another system before the vulnerable institution notices the discrepancy.
    • Malicious actors usually prefer to convert the balance to another crypto-currency such as Bitcoin, because blockchain transactions are usually irreversible. With a withdrawal to a fiat currency system, the financial institution may be able to reverse or cancel the transaction several days after it initially executes.
    • In the case of an exchange, the malicious actor can also withdraw an XAG balance directly back into the XAG Ledger.

In the case of a merchant, the order of operations is slightly different, but the concept is the same:

  1. The malicious actor requests to buy a large amount of goods or services.
  2. The vulnerable merchant invoices the malicious actor for the price of those goods and services.
  3. The malicious actor sends a Payment transaction to the merchant. This transaction has a large Amount field and has the tfPartialPayment flag enabled.
  4. The partial payment succeeds (result code tesSUCCESS) but delivers only a very small amount of the currency specified.
  5. The vulnerable merchant reads the transaction's Amount field without looking at the Flags field or delivered_amount metadata field.
  6. The vulnerable merchant treats the invoice as paid and provides the goods or services to the malicious actor, despite only receiving a much smaller delivered_amount in the XAG Ledger.
  7. The malicious actor uses, resells, or absconds with the goods and services before the merchant notices the discrepancy.

Further Mitigations

Using the delivered_amount field when processing incoming transactions is enough to avoid this exploit. Still, additional proactive business practices can also avoid or mitigate the likelihood of this and similar exploits. For example:

  • Add additional sanity checks to your business logic for processing withdrawals. Never process a withdrawal if the total balance you hold in the XAG Ledger does not match your expected assets and obligations.
  • Follow "Know Your Customer" guidelines and strictly verify your customers' identities. You may be able to recognize and block malicious users in advance, or pursue legal action against a malicious actor who exploits your system.

See Also